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This is a thread of threads providing high level but reasonably detailed overview for the Russian NC3
If you have questions please feel free to ask them though I hope you understand if I don’t answer some of them (ie exact geolocation of key nodes) for obvious reasons.
Back to the future!
After several decades of discontinued use Bundeswehr intends to acquire new troposcatter communication systems, in a highly portable configuration enabling broadband transmissions up to 60 km. Framework contract to cover low three digit number of sets.
hartpunkt.de/satellitenunabh…
I am a simple man, I want a combination of Begemot, division scale launch and command missile use.
Ahh, and IL80/82, Tu-142MR on flight radar.
🇷🇺🚀☢️Three weeks after France and three and a half months after China, it is now the Russian Navy's turn to demonstrate the operational and technological credibility of its sea-based nuclear component, with a BULAVA ballistic missile (SLBM) launch expected from a BOREI(-A)-class SSBN, from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Chizha impact area in northeastern Russia.
This launch is very interesting and eagerly awaited for at least two reasons:
- Russian strategic forces usually conduct a major exercise every October. However, a surprise exercise already took place in May this year. The question was (and still is) whether it would replace the October one. This launch could indicate that it did not. That said, we will have to wait to know whether other strategic weapons launches (YARS ICBMs, Kh-102 cruise missiles, etc.) take place over the same period. For now, it's only one launch;
- The BULAVA is the Russian Navy's most recent SLBM and is the delivery vehicle that carries the largest number of operational nuclear warheads in the country's arsenal. Yet it has not been launched since October 2024, while its predecessor, the SINEVA, has been launched several times since then, including last May. Moreover, the latest BOREI-A-class SSBN was commissioned without the usual qualification launch. It is therefore possible that the weapon system (the missile or the submarine) is experiencing technical problems. If successful, the launch planned for next week would therefore reaffirm the technological and operational credibility of this system, which is critical to Russian deterrence.
Wait and see now ⏲️
krakek retweeted
“In 2025, before the large-scale winter attacks, local generation played a key role in supplying electricity to the city. According to sources at one of the energy companies who spoke to Ekonomichna Pravda, it may have accounted for as much as 1.3 GW. This came primarily from Kyiv CHP-5, CHP-6 and Darnytsia CHP (CHP-4) – combined heat and power plants (CHP plants) that produce both electricity and heat for the city's district heating network.
These plants are now no longer able to generate electricity…
In a relatively favourable scenario, energy workers will repair damaged equipment and new strikes will not cause critical losses. In that case, restrictions may be moderate, although avoiding power cuts altogether will be difficult. For consumers, this would mean 8-10 hours without electricity per day.
If the attacks continue and some equipment remains damaged, Kyiv could face longer power cuts during moderately cold spells. Under this scenario, outages could last 12-16 hours per day.
The worst-case scenario involves regular large-scale strikes on key substations and other elements of the power system amid severe frosts. In that case, restrictions could last up to 20 hours per day. However, sources in the energy sector interviewed by Ekonomichna Pravda do not believe in a scenario in which the Russians would manage to destroy everything and ‘plunge Kyiv into darkness’.”
pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2…
While such radars have many limitations (ie ionosphere sensitivity, resolution and track accuracy, number of sectors being scanned simultaneously), having two of them can be quite helpful, as they can cover each other’s blindspots.
Two maps that illustrate how little the construction of a 29B6 Container over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar in Kaliningrad changes things in terms of Russia's ability to monitor aircraft movements west of Russia's primary western frontier. The maps depict the notional coverage of two 29B6 OTH-B radars configured for 360- degree coverage over 800-3000 km and are intended to draw attention to the blind spot resulting from the skip zone. The existing 29B6 radar in Mordovia already offered extensive coverage of most of Europe as well as Ukraine.
krakek retweeted
This short threat on the 1989 MOD assessment of the Soviet military threat to the UK may interest @ColdWarPod @NavyLookout @Osinttechnical @alessionaval @ESlibrarian @IBallantyn @edwardstrngr65 @nicholadrummond @FennellJW @geoallison @krakek1 @ajcboyd among others...
Every so often I check frontier models in areas where I have some sort of understanding.
With some caveats they are pretty strong nowadays.
Some steering and polish would be useful (and maybe softer on refusals to model historical targeting) but I would say that it would clear the pass bar for such work in the past.
krakek retweeted
The annual US strategic nuclear exercise Global Thunder is underway. STRATCOM says part of the objective is to “enhance nuclear readiness.” stratcom.mil/Media/News/News… Global Thunder begins as NATO’s annual tac nuke ex Steadfast Noon ends in Europe. #GT27
krakek retweeted
Imagine a U.S.-Russian conflict in which Russia threatened to use a nuclear weapon in space, destroying the Starlink constellation, unless Musk withdrew U.S. access from the system.
What do you think Musk would do? (1/2)
krakek retweeted
Soviets have deployed Korund and then Korund-M systems during tv Cold War, to support the SMFs and NCA users.
This system used sats on Molnya orbits and C-band comms, with parallel 2k baud lines available.
This provided a redundant alternative to landlines.
