Nick zheng retweeted
Replying to @jy201506
Nick zheng retweeted
$REPL Q2 2027 earnings: Replimune launches its melanoma drug, and trial cuts shrink losses
Replimune, a cancer biotechnology firm, shifted from drug development to commercial sales while cutting its operating loss. The company recorded no revenue before the quarter ended in September, then delivered its newly approved skin cancer therapy Tudriqev to the first patients on October 6. Chief executive Sushil Patel said more than 15 hospitals have already prescribed the treatment, while winding down older clinical trials cut quarterly operating expenses by 33% to $56 million.
โข Operating loss: $๐๐.๐๐ (-33% from a year ago)
โข Cash and short-term investments: $๐๐๐.๐๐ (up from $195.3M last quarter)
โข Prescribing hospitals: >๐๐ (since October 6 launch)
โข Cash funding outlook: ๐๐ง๐๐ก๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ (greater than 12 months)
โ๏ธ ๐๐๐ซ๐๐ข๐๐ญ: ๐ข Bullish
The story got better because the launch started on schedule with broad insurer support and a rebuilt $308 million cash cushion. Inclusion in national cancer guidelines and an unrestricted label helped the sales team reach over 70% of its 200 target hospitals quickly. One caution: the August stock sale and September loan draw increased the share count by 14% from a year ago and pushed debt interest costs higher.
The question now is how quickly hospital interest turns into collected revenue. Either routine skin injections drive fast repeat orders, or the need to coordinate radiologists for deep-organ injections slows patient volumes. Next quarter's first reported product sales will provide the answer.
Full article with charts - link in bio
๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฌ๐
๐ข๐ข ๐๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐ข๐ช๐๐ฏ ๐๐๐๐๐ก๐๐ฌ ๐
๐ข๐ซ๐ฌ๐ญ ๐๐๐ฅ๐๐ง๐จ๐ฆ๐ ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฌ ๐๐ข๐ญ๐ก ๐๐ซ๐จ๐๐ ๐๐จ๐ฏ๐๐ซ๐๐ ๐
Replimune, a biotechnology firm that develops virus-based cancer therapies, started commercial sales of its first approved medicine right after the quarter closed. Its lead treatment is Tudriqev (previously called RP1), a modified virus injected into tumours alongside the immunotherapy drug nivolumab for adults with advanced skin melanoma. โThe response from physicians has been enthusiastic and both oncologists and interventional radiologists are eager to bring TUDRIQEV into their practices,โ chief executive Sushil Patel said.
Doctors gave the first patient doses on October 6, and clinics began ordering the drug โfor next day delivery immediately upon availabilityโ. The launch is moving fast because the approved label covers patients โwith no requirement for prior BRAF treatment, and can be injected into superficial, deep and visceral lesions, including lung and liverโ.
โข Prescribing clinics: more than 15 institutions in the first three weeks
โข Priority hospitals contacted: over 70% of the initial 200 targets (more than 140 accounts by our math)
โข Treatment guidelines: listed as a Category 2A recommendation by the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN, an alliance of cancer centres)
โข Supply on hand: โmore than a year of inventory on hand, produced at its in-house manufacturing facilityโ
What to watch: the first reported product revenue in the third-quarter results. Because the drug shipped on October 6, next quarter will offer the first dollar reading on how quickly those 15 clinics turn prescriptions into paid sales.
๐ข ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐ฅ ๐๐ข๐ง๐-๐๐จ๐ฐ๐ง๐ฌ ๐๐ฎ๐ญ ๐๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐ฌ๐๐ฌ ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ก๐ข๐ซ๐
While the drug maker prepared for its first commercial launch, it cut its operating loss by a third from a year ago. Total operating costs fell 33.2% to $56.3 million, down from $84.3 million in the prior year. Research and development (R&D, the cost of running clinical trials and lab work) drove most of the savings, dropping 40.6% to $34.4 million.
Replimune spent less because it wound down three older clinical trialsโIGNYTE, ARTACUS and CERPASSโand reduced staff costs. Selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A, the cost of sales teams and corporate overhead) also fell 17.0% from a year ago to $21.9 million. Both expense lines included $10.6 million of non-cash stock compensation by our math.
What to watch: research and development spending over the second half of the year. Continuing declines would confirm that the cost savings from finished trials more than offset the cost of enrolling the Phase 3 IGNYTE-3 and Phase 2/3 REVEAL studies.
๐ข ๐๐ญ๐จ๐๐ค ๐๐๐ฅ๐ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฐ ๐๐๐๐ฎ๐ข๐ฅ๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐ฌ๐ก ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐๐ซ
A new cancer drug launch requires a large cash cushion before insurer payments arrive. The Massachusetts biotech ended September with $307.8 million in cash, up 57.6% from $195.3 million three months earlier. It raised $141.0 million net by selling stock and pre-funded warrants in August, and it drew another $15.0 million from its long-term loan in September.
By our math, cash burn before financing dropped to $43.5 million in the second quarter, down from $73.6 million in the first quarter. Lower clinical trial spending slowed the cash drain just as the new financing arrived, giving the business more breathing room for the Tudriqev rollout.
What to watch: quarterly cash burn before financing in the third quarter. A number near or below $45 million would show that early commercial receipts and lower research costs are keeping the cash drain in check.
๐ป ๐๐๐๐ซ ๐๐๐ฌ๐
๐ด ๐๐ญ๐จ๐๐ค ๐๐๐๐๐ซ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ฌ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฐ๐ฌ ๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ ๐๐ก๐๐ซ๐๐ก๐จ๐ฅ๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ
Funding the company through stock sales and venture loans carries a clear cost for existing owners. The weighted average share count rose 14.4% from a year ago to 105.2 million shares, and it climbed 8.6% from the first quarter alone after the August stock and warrant offering.
At the same time, borrowing more money is lifting interest bills while falling cash balances over the past year reduced interest income. Interest expense on debt jumped 69.6% from a year ago to $2.5 million after the September loan draw, while investment income fell by half to $1.9 million.
What to watch: additional drawdowns on the debt facility and the diluted share count as pre-funded warrants convert. Further loan draws would push quarterly interest costs higher before Tudriqev sales cover operating expenses.
๐ด๐ด ๐๐๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ก ๐๐จ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฌ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ ๐๐ก๐ข๐ฅ๐ ๐๐จ๐ง๐๐ข๐ซ๐ฆ๐๐ญ๐จ๐ซ๐ฒ ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐ฅ ๐๐ข๐ฌ๐ค ๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ข๐ง๐ฌ
Patel highlighted rapid hospital interest in Tudriqev, yet the company gave no sales forecast for the year and faces rising commercial bills. While selling and administrative costs fell from a year ago, they rose 15.5% from last quarter to $21.9 million as the sales force geared up for the October launch.
In addition, the drug requires an injection directly into deep tumours such as the lung and liver, which requires interventional radiologists and complex hospital workflows. Finally, the US regulator granted accelerated approval based on tumour shrinkage rates, so keeping the drug on the market depends on โverification of clinical benefit in a confirmatory trial(s)โโspecifically the ongoing IGNYTE-3 survival study.
What to watch: selling, general and administrative costs alongside initial product sales next quarter. If commercial overhead grows faster than early prescription revenue, cash burn will climb again despite the research cuts.
โ โข โ โข โ
๐ฒ ๐๐ญ๐ก๐๐ซ ๐๐๐๐ฌ
๐๐จ๐ซ๐ค๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐๐ฉ๐ข๐ญ๐๐ฅ (๐๐๐๐): $๐๐๐.๐ ๐ฆ๐ข๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ข๐จ๐ง โ reversing
Working capitalโshort-term assets minus short-term billsโrebounded 71.5% from $162.4 million last quarter after shrinking for four straight periods. The August stock sale and September debt draw drove the increase, leaving a larger short-term buffer to fund commercial inventory and receivables.
๐๐๐ญ ๐ฅ๐จ๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ ๐ฌ๐ก๐๐ซ๐ (๐๐๐๐): -$๐.๐๐ โ decelerating
The net loss per share narrowed 40.0% from -$0.90 a year ago and shrank from -$0.72 in the first quarter. Lower clinical trial expenses cut the total net loss by 31.3% to $57.1 million, while a higher share count spread the loss across more shares.
โ โข โ โข โ
๐ฎ ๐๐ฎ๐ข๐๐๐ง๐๐
๐๐๐ฌ๐ก ๐ซ๐ฎ๐ง๐ฐ๐๐ฒ: ๐๐ซ๐๐๐ญ๐๐ซ ๐ญ๐ก๐๐ง ๐๐ ๐ฆ๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐ก๐ฌ โ stable
๐ unchanged from Greater than 12 months
Unchanged. Replimune said its $307.8 million in cash will โenable us to fund operations for greater than twelve monthsโ from the filing date, covering the Tudriqev rollout and ongoing trials. By our math, at the second quarter's $43.5 million cash burn rate, the balance equals roughly seven quarters of funding before counting any product revenue.
โ โข โ โข โ
โ ๐๐๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐ฌ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ
๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ง๐๐ญ ๐ฉ๐ซ๐ข๐๐ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐ฌ๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐๐ซ๐ข๐ช๐๐ฏ?
Management noted multiple insurer policies and over 15 prescribing hospitals, but it did not disclose wholesale pricing or expected gross-to-net discounts. Investors need unit pricing to calculate how many patients the company must treat to cover its $56 million quarterly operating expense.
๐๐จ๐ฐ ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ฒ ๐ฉ๐ซ๐-๐๐ฎ๐ง๐๐๐ ๐ฐ๐๐ซ๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐๐ข๐ง ๐จ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ฌ๐ข๐๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐ก๐๐ซ๐ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ง๐ญ?
The August offering included both common stock and pre-funded warrants, raising $141 million net. Because pre-funded warrants sit outside the basic share count until exercised, knowing the exact warrant count will clarify total future dilution.
๐๐จ๐ฐ ๐๐๐ฌ๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐ ๐๐๐๐ฉ-๐ฅ๐๐ฌ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐ข๐ง๐ฃ๐๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง๐ฌ ๐๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐๐๐จ๐ฉ๐ญ๐๐?
The approved label allows injections into deep organs like the lung and liver, which requires interventional radiologists alongside oncologists. Sharing the split between surface skin injections and deep organ procedures would show whether hospital scheduling slows adoption.
๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐ข๐ฌ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ซ๐ซ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐๐ง๐ซ๐จ๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ญ ๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐๐๐๐-๐ ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐?
Both the 400-patient IGNYTE-3 confirmatory study and the 280-patient REVEAL uveal melanoma study are actively enrolling, yet the release gave no patient counts or completion dates. Since full approval depends on IGNYTE-3, enrollment progress is critical.
Replying to @vrotjan
$LQDA represented to Andrews that they would remove it from the label if Andrews required it. They should prepare to do what they stated. That does not preclude them asking for Andrews, in the public interest, to carve out sales to one or more classes of patients that need Yutrepia.
Patents are the grant of property for a limited term to the patent holder to promote the advance of inventions that benefit society in exchange for enablement.
In this case UTHRโs invention has led to a further invention that reads on UTHRโs patent, namely Yutrepia. But Yutrepia is also patented which prevents UTHR practicing the advance.
Thus, without some exception, the public interest is defeated. The technology cannot advance. Patients with a degenerative fatal disease are deprived of a better treatment.
UTHR does not even benefit when patients cannot tolerate their drugs. This is a lose, lose, lose situation. UTHR loses, LQDA loses, and society loses as our people suffer and die when they could be treated.
This is one reading of Hatch-Waxman.
But this is exactly why we have courts to administer justice.
Justice demands a carve out that allows patients the right to take Yutrepia. Justice also requires reasonable compensation to UTHR if the patent is upheld.
Interestingly I have yet to have anyone tell me why my view is wrong, other than HW says otherwise.
Nick zheng retweeted
$REPL The more I think about this companyโs potential the more I like it. No black box. No major side effects .Low cost of production which is controlled by company.Easy training of interventional radiologists.Lots of hospitals will want to participate,loved by oncologists and the supply of interventional radiologists looking for an intervention is growing.
All the national and international conversation concerning this drug puts 99% of oncologists educated on the drug.Patient awareness is of course off the chart
$LQDA History of patent case law development. - I will try for better formatting in replies.
Courts almost always invoke the public interest to tailor exclusion, rather than defeat it. Below are the cases that matter, grouped by era, with what each held and what it means for Yutrepia. I'm working from memory rather than the reporters, so verify pin cites and procedural details before relying on any of them.
I. The historical baseline (preโ1982)
Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag, 210 U.S. 405 (1908)
Holding: a patentee that doesn't practice its invention may still enjoin infringers. Nonโuse is not a defense to exclusion.
This is the foundation of the "right to exclude" baseline you're invoking.
The Court reserved the question whether public need could ever justify refusing relief.
City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934)
Facts: the city's sewage plant infringed a sludgeโtreatment patent.
Holding: the court refused an injunction because shutting the plant would dump raw sewage into Lake Michigan and endanger public health. The patentee was limited to damages, which functioned as a compulsory royalty.
This is the canonical publicโhealth denial. The Federal Circuit later cited it in RiteโHite (1995, en banc) as the paradigm case where courts may withhold an injunction because "a patentee's failure to practice โฆ frustrates an important public need."
Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944)
Facts: WARF's vitamin D irradiation patents were licensed so as to keep the vitamin out of oleomargarine, the butter substitute poorer consumers relied on.
The court invoked public health and nutrition in denying relief. The case is entangled with patent misuse and invalidity, so it is weaker as a pure publicโinterest precedent.
HartfordโEmpire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945)
Compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties was imposed as an antitrust remedy, not under patent equity.
This confirms the point from my last reply: preโHW courtโimposed royalties came mostly through antitrust decrees.
Special Equipment v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945)
Reaffirmed that a patentee may suppress its invention.
Justice Douglas's dissent argued suppression contradicts the constitutional purpose. That view lost, but it sits in the background of every "public need" argument.
II. Federal Circuit, preโeBay (1982โ2006)
During this period, an injunction followed infringement as a "general rule" (e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki, 1989). The public interest operated only at the margins.
Hybritech v. Abbott Labs, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
Facts: preliminary injunction on monoclonalโantibody diagnostic kits.
The district court exempted Abbott's cancer and hepatitis test kits from the injunction because of their publicโhealth importance. The Federal Circuit affirmed the injunction as so tailored.
This is the closest preโeBay analogue for a medical carveโout inside an injunction.
RiteโHite v. Kelley, 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
Primarily a damages case. Its dicta acknowledged the Milwaukee line: courts may decline injunctions where a public need is frustrated.
The pharmaceutical preliminaryโinjunction cases of the era
These consistently said the public interest is served by enforcing valid patents to protect R&D incentives.
They gave low weight to the "cheaper or alternative drug" arguments of generic challengers.
III. eBay and the modern framework
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
Holding: no automatic injunctions. The four equitable factors apply, the fourth being that the public interest would not be disserved.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence flagged patentโassertion entities and patents on small components of complex products as situations where damages may suffice.
Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence stressed the historical practice of granting injunctions in "the vast majority" of cases.
The two concurrences frame your debate: Kennedy supports flexibility, Roberts supports the historical exclusion baseline.
Paice v. Toyota, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
Holding: when an injunction is denied, the court may set an ongoing royalty for future infringement.
This created the modern judicial royaltyโinโlieu mechanism.
The Federal Circuit said such awards should be the exception and should give the parties a chance to negotiate first.
IV. PostโeBay: pharmaceutical cases
SanofiโSynthelabo v. Apotex, 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Plavix)
Facts: Apotex launched generic clopidogrel at risk.
Holding: preliminary injunction affirmed. The district court found the public interest in enforcing likelyโvalid patents and preserving pharmaceutical R&D incentives outweighed the public's interest in lower prices. The Federal Circuit endorsed that reasoning.
Significance: price and access arguments alone lose in pharma. Plavix had an identical branded alternative, so no patient was deprived of the molecule.
Abbott Labs v. Andrx (Fed. Cir. 2006โ07) and similar preliminaryโinjunction cases
These repeat the formula that there is a significant public interest in encouraging investment in drug development, enforced through patent rights.
The general pattern in drug cases
The patentee nearly always sells the same molecule, so the publicโinterest factor usually collapses into "patients still have the patentee's drug."
Yutrepia breaks that pattern only if Liquidia proves clinical nonโsubstitutability.
V. PostโeBay: device and technology cases (the tailoring cases)
Edwards Lifesciences v. CoreValve/Medtronic (D. Del. 2014; earlier Fed. Cir. 699 F.3d 1305 (2012))
Facts: transcatheter heart valves. After a jury verdict and remand, Judge Sleet entered a permanent injunction against Medtronic's CoreValve.
As I recall, the injunction carved out patients for whom Edwards's Sapien valve was clinically unsuitable, letting physicians continue using CoreValve for them.
The parties settled shortly after for a large lump sum plus ongoing royalties.
Significance: this is the most direct template for Liquidia. It shows exclusion with a medicalโnecessity carveโout, defined by clinical unsuitability of the patentee's own product.
Baxter v. Fresenius (N.D. Cal. 2007; Fed. Cir. 582 F.3d 1288 (2009))
Facts: hemodialysis machines.
The district court entered an injunction with a transition or sunset period so dialysis clinics and patients wouldn't be disrupted, with a royalty during the sunset.
The Federal Circuit vacated parts on other grounds, and a later PTO reexamination ultimately wiped out the patent.
Significance: sunset plus royalty is an accepted way to accommodate patient continuity.
Acumed v. Stryker, 551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
Facts: orthopedic nails. The injunction was affirmed.
Surgeons' preference for the infringing device did not establish a public interest overriding exclusion.
Significance: physician preference is not enough. You need evidence of clinical need, which is a warning for Liquidia's evidentiary record.
i4i v. Microsoft, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
The injunction was affirmed as tailored to exclude existing users, in the court's view because the public interest favored not disrupting the installed base.
Significance: an installedโbase carveโout maps onto grandfathering stabilized patients.
Broadcom v. Qualcomm, 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
Sunset provisions in an injunction were affirmed to limit harm to third parties (carriers and consumers).
Apple v. Samsung, 809 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
The court said the public interest "nearly always" favors protecting property rights absent countervailing factors, especially when the patentee practices the invention.
Significance: this is UTHR's best quotation. Liquidia's job is to supply the countervailing factor.
VI. HatchโWaxman specifically
ยง271(e)(4)(A)
The text ("shall") leaves no room for equitable balancing on the approval date. Courts treat the reset as automatic once (e)(2) infringement of a valid claim is found.
The public interest enters only through:the (e)(4)(B) injunction, which is discretionary under ยง283 and governed by eBay;
stays pending appeal under the Nken factors, which include harm to third parties and the public;
the scope of the judgment, such as whether the reset is tied to the indication.
I don't know of a reported case in which a court let patient need modify an (e)(4)(A) reset.
VII. Comparative: the case Liquidia's argument actually resembles
Merck v. Shionogi, Raltegravir/Isentress (German Federal Patent Court 2016; BGH 2017)
Facts: Shionogi asserted a patent against Merck's HIV integrase inhibitor Isentress.
Holding: German courts granted Merck a compulsory license under ยง24 of the German Patent Act on publicโinterest grounds. The finding was that identifiable patient groups (infants, pregnant women, patients stabilized on raltegravir or at risk from switching) had no adequate substitute.
Significance: this is the cleanest judicial articulation anywhere of "patients who can't use alternatives will be harmed, so license at a royalty." The US has no statutory equivalent.ยง1498 covers only government use.
BayhโDole marchโin is inapplicable here.
In the US the same reasoning must travel through eBay factor four, which means a tailored injunction plus royalty, not a formal compulsory license.
Synthesis: what actually wins on public interest
Argument Track record Lower price or more competition Loses (Plavix line) Physician or patient preference Loses (Acumed) Disruption of existing users Often wins a carveโout or sunset (i4i, Baxter, Broadcom) Documented clinical unsuitability of the patentee's own product Wins a carveโout (Hybritech, Edwards); wins a compulsory license abroad (Raltegravir) Wholesale denial of exclusion on public health Rare; essentially limited to Milwaukeeโtype facts with no alternative at all
For Yutrepia, Liquidia's realistic winning theory combines the Edwards and Raltegravir patterns:
an identifiable PHโILD cohort that is clinically nonโsubstitutable on Tyvaso or Tyvaso DPI, proven with physician and dosing evidence;
a grandfathering carveโout for stabilized patients;
an ongoing royalty under Paice for both groups.
That is achievable within the (e)(4)(B) and stay analysis. It does not touch the mandatory label reset.
Replying to @29374736ahshsv @Biomaven
$LQDA I think I understand.
That is Hatch-Waxman. The provision essentially mandates blocking as the remedy for this class of patent infringement cases.
That is exactly the way patents worked historically. The remedy for infringement was BLOCKING, injunction, the right of the patent holder to EXCLUSIVE use and licensing of the innovation.
Hatch-Waxman restored it for certain patents.
Now we have history repeating itself. Pre-HW, when the courts faced companies that did not intend to sell the product they sought to block, or in the case of cross blocking patents, the courts imposed a royalty that protected/compensated the patent holder while fostering the public interest of having access to the new product.
In the '327 context, the courts are again faced squarely with cross blocking patents where the innovator LQDA, has a substantially better delivery version of Treprostinil. Andrews has ruled Yutrepia infringes '327 and UTHR cannot use the PRINT patented tech to make a product like Yutrepia. Cross blocking, neither company can provide the drug form that patients need.
It appears to me that Andrews has taken the strict statutory construction route and appears ready to ignore patients that have been stabilized by Yutrepia after failing to tolerate other versions of Treprostinil. I hope I am wrong on this and that he will be willing to carve out enforcement for patients that do not tolerate other versions of Treprostinil.
Perversely, IF Andrews view is as I have stated, with no carve out for the Tyvaso intolerant, then the value of $LQDA transfers to $UTHR. That happens in two ways. Higher sales of Tyvaso. But most amusingly, UTHR becomes the natural buyer of LQDA. They own the Treprostinil franchise and can acquire on the cheap Yutrepia and L606.
The $BNTX "cancer vaccine" (which is highly similar to the $MRNA "cancer vaccine") just failed in colorectal cancer adjuvant setting this morning.
This gets at a point that I was perhaps inarticulate about making clear as to why I am not (at all) convinced this $MRNA in melanoma success will actually translate to other cancer settings. Success in ADJUVANT melanoma is *not* a strong PoC for generalizing to other indications.
I've seen several people say "Well, the $BNTX vaccine failed in melanoma where $MRNA's succeeded, so maybe $MRNA has the better vaccine and it *could* work in other cancer types unlike $BNTX's."
But this notion is just wrong - $MRNA did NOT succeed where $BNTX failed. $MRNA's success came in a setting where $BNTX's vaccine wasn't actually studied at all.
$BNTX failed with their vaccine in treating *active* melanoma tumors. Patients in that study had melanoma so advanced it could not be cut out of the body, so the treatments were used to try to shrink/kill those tumors.
$MRNA had success in the *adjuvant* setting, meaning that the patients actually had no evidence of any active melanoma in the body. Any/all of the identifiable melanoma in the body had already been cut out! Now, those patients are still at risk for the melanoma to come back from some metastasis that is so microscopically small we have no way of detecting it. That *recurrence* is what $MRNA was treating - NOT active, large tumors.
SHRINKING tumors and preventing them from reoccurring are VERY different things. Laypeople who don't know what "adjuvant" treatment means are missing an absolutely key point.
This distinction is super important to understand, because as I see it, $BNTX already serves as proof of concept that $MRNA's limited melanoma adjuvant success *won't* translate to other tumor types, or even tumor settings (adjuvant vs advanced/unresectable). Also note that $BNTX's failures outside of melanoma have been in the ADJUVANT setting too...so even "adjuvant ex-melanoma" opportunities may not exist for $MRNA.
Now, for all intents and purposes, the $MRNA/$BNTX vaccines are likely *HIGHLY* similar. There are only so many neoantigens/genes that you can choose from. Failure for $BNTX should be considered to have major readthrough to $MRNA.
That doesn't mean it isn't worth studying. The $MRNA vaccine *could* work where $BNTX failed, but so far that is NOT what we have seen, contrary to widespread belief. $MRNA has only showed us the absolute lowest possible bar of PoC - efficacy in *the most* immune sensitive type of cancer and in patients with the lowest possible disease burden (i.e. "none"). $BNTX didn't even study their vaccine in that population.
As always, I hope it works, but hopefully this does a better job of laying out the rationale behind my skepticism.
tl;dr - $BNTX's cancer vaccine keeps failing in "true" cancer trials (both adjuvant and advanced/metastatic), and so far we have little to no reason to believe that $MRNA's won't too. $MRNA did *NOT* succeed where $BNTX failed - they tested a bar so low that $BNTX hadn't even tried yet.
โRemember that time $MRNA caused the biggest short squeeze in the history of the S&P500 by launching a massive press blitz that convinced a bunch of generalists that they โcured cancerโ based on a melanoma trial where the patients didnโt even have any tumors?โ
Nick zheng retweeted
Nick zheng retweeted
$mrna sometimes the 'specialists' are the ones who least understand biotech stocks.
Ever since the covid days, Moderna has had a huge retail following. Even small news items like earnings caused this to be a trending ticker on yahoo, also during the sub $10B MC days.
Congrats to everybody else for seeing the world as it is.
Nick zheng retweeted
$AQST Blood Pressure Data Explained
The time required to opening the package and correct placement of the film under the tongue is easy to understand. Yet, many will find more explanation helpful about the blood pressure data for placement on top of the tongue versus an intramuscul (IM) injection or EpiPen.
When you take an Epinephrine med, you want to see blood pressure go up. That is a sign that the med is working.
When someone has a severe allergic reaction (anaphylaxis), there is a release of histamine and bradykinin which prompts blood vessels, particularly small ones, to widen or dilate.ย Fluid can leak out of vessels and into surrounding tissues causing swelling, itching, sneezing, and hives.ย These events can cause a life-threatening loss in blood pressure and result in loss of consciousness. So, a blood pressure boost from epi is really helpful.
You may have noticed that the blood pressure data does not look great for manual IM injections. With an standard injection in the thigh, it has been asserted that vasodilation increases blood flow in the thigh muscle and causes a decrease in blood pressure. (With more blood located in the thigh, there is a decrease in blood in system circulation. )
For manual IM injections, epinephrine tends to pool at the end of the needle. With autoinjectors like the EpiPen, it is typically delivered deeper and at high pressure. This can result in it being distributed over a larger area. So, the blood pressure data looks much better for the EpiPen.
Here, the blood pressure data would be even better if the med was placed under the tongue. Under the tongue the med flows into a dense network of blood vessels that drain directly into the internal jugular vein. The internal jugular vein functions as a superhighway to the heart. Yet, today's data shows that it get results similar to an EpiPen when placed on top of the tongue.
(Also, keep in mind that Anaphylm is a prodrug. It does not become epi until it reaches the bloodstream. That avoids some of the limitations of standard epi.)
Nick zheng retweeted
$REPL
An ORR data compromise between REPL & FDA that put patients' accessibility first, i.e. ORR is not 34% per REPL, nor 15% per FDA, but 24.2% in 91 [out of 140 "evaluable patients with at least one non-injected lesion"].
Thanks to AdCom's thoughtful input!
Kudos to the AdCom, @US_FDA & @Replimune!
RP1+Niv, go and save lives!!! ir.replimune.com/news-releasโฆ
Nick zheng retweeted
RIP $PGEN shorts
PAPZIMEOS net revenue of $53.1 million in Q2 of 2026,
more than double the prior quarter,
reflects accelerating commercial momentum and broad US adoption
PAPZIMEOS revenue propelled to quarterly #profitability
expected cash flow breakeven by the end of 2026
Nick zheng retweeted
$REPL Fortunately company was able to hang on to its manufacturing facility even though operations and employment were scaled back.Not sure if people realize how big a market the company has.They have maintained worldwide rights to a treatment that can be given in local facilities and minimal side effects.Yervoy can cause renal failure tremendous toxicity.Patents are going to be clamoring for this treatment.
Nick zheng retweeted
Replying to @matthewherper
Yep - Makary and Prasad must be gnashing their teeth right now seeing actual scientific discussions happen out in the open rather than behind closed doors
Nick zheng retweeted
$REPL disagree!
The ORR in Pd1 -ve was 24.4% in a PD1 R/R population.
I expect <5% ORR with PD1 rechallenge in this subgroup.
Nick zheng retweeted
Replying to @adamfeuerstein
$REPL I am shocked to see FDA's removed all-injected n=25 from the numerator and not denominator is their ORR.
Nick zheng retweeted
$REPL lets go! Great presentation and refutes all the FDA nit picky questions, itโs obvious this is real, just approve it and move on lol. Itโs obvious that retreatment witj checkpoints in these refractory patients does nothing, and the overall survival data seals the deal
Nick zheng retweeted
Thanks STAT for the coverage.
In an alternate universe, where it makes more sense to reject a promising treatment because
its specific [beneficial] contribution to a combo treatment is unknown or unknowable (out of ethical reasons for not having a control group).
In the absence of treatment-related death, it's mistaken to put the uncertainties of not knowing, i.e. if or how much $REPL's RP1 contributed OVER the observed benefits.
@US_FDA or Adcom panelists are not mandated to find mechanistic certainties about how a drug candidate works with a combo drug, but to assess whether or not the risk/benefit to the patients are favorable.
For PD1 failed melanoma patients, they could live with NOT knowing how the combo treatment works, if ONLY they are given the chance to LIVE at all.
Nick zheng retweeted
$REPL My takeaways after reading the briefing document [1]
(1) [2025-current] FDA does NOT agree with [2024] FDA re Niv+PR1 for anti-PD1 failed melanoma patients program.
(2) [2024] FDA, since 2021, has NO problems with IGNYTE being a single-arm, combo drugs trial, e.g. from 2021 to 2024 Dec, the only protocol change is the *"Inclusion criteria", i.e. not "Arms & Interventions" or "Outcome Measures" [pre-specified endpoints] [2]
*In my opinion, changes in "inclusion criteria" after 2021 indicated that 2024 FDA were aware of the heterogeneity nature of the target population and what was needed for a single-arm trial data to generate clinically-meaningful data in the target patients.
[2021-2024] FDA agreed with the company, given the ethical concerns for the target patients & serious medical needs, limitations of a single-arm trial do NOT outweigh what its successful outcomes can bring, e.g. a new potential (combo drugs) treatment for the patients. So, in Nov 2024, FDA accepted REPL's BLA filing as well as granting "Breakthrough Therapy" designation [3]
(3) However, for [2025-current] FDA, IGNYTE, being a single arm, combo drugs, trial, is in itself very challenging or unacceptable. Every criticism from [2025-current] FDA inevitably comes back to concerns over the fact that the current FDA cannot evaluate or estimate RP1's contribution to the combo treatment, as if that is the MOST and ONLY important item which IGNYTE was "not designed" to do.
Yes, the logic seems very odd here, but this is what it is.
Instead of evaluating IGNYTE's data to see if the Niv-RP1 combo drugs is likely to improve target patients' outcome via ORR (overall response rate) data, the current FDA is obsessed with every limitation that IGNYTE was "not designed" to answer.
Source:
[1] fda.gov/media/193878/downloaโฆ
[2] clinicaltrials.gov/study/NCTโฆ
[3] ir.replimune.com/news-releasโฆ

























